Moral Imperatives versus Market Solutions: Is Health Care a Right? (reviewing \u3ci\u3eMortal Peril: Our Inalienable Right to Health Care?\u3c/i\u3e by Richard A. Epstein) by Brennan, Troyen A.
REVIEWS
Moral Imperatives Versus Market Solutions:
Is Health Care a Right?
Troyen A Brennant
Mortal Peril: Our Inalienable Right to Health Care?. Richard A.
Epstein. Addison Wesley, 1997. Pp vii, 503.
INTRODUCTION
Mortal Peril: Our Inalienable Right to Health Care? is an
outstanding book about many of the most controversial issues in
health care today. Arguing from a libertarian perspective that
prizes individual property and contract rights, Richard Epstein,
Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, is able to shed new
light on a variety of controversies in medical care.
There is, however, something slightly anachronistic about
Epstein's arguments. Perhaps this is best captured in his pref-
ace. He relates how he was asked to a taping of the television
program "Nightline" on the Clinton health plan (p ix). Upon arri-
val, Epstein was relegated to the back of the auditorium, from
where he was unable to obtain access to the microphone. Mean-
while, an inner circle of scholars, perhaps those more sympa-
thetic to the Clinton health plan, were able to provide their im-
pressions at will. For most academics, this would have been a
t Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School; Professor of Law and Public Policy,
Harvard School of Public Health; President and Chief Executive Officer, Brigham and
Women's Physician Hospital Organization.
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very difficult position; for someone so full of trenchant arguments
as Epstein, it must have been intolerable.
According to Epstein, the discussion presumed a universal
right to health care. Moral imperatives and not market solu-
tions-which Epstein was precluded from addressing-carried
the day. Discussing the experience, Epstein notes, "I fall into a
rival camp of beleaguered scholars who believe that the basic
principles of human behavior and institutional organization do
not magically cease to apply when health-related issues are on
the table" (p xi). I would venture to propose that just the opposite
is true: Epstein's anecdote aside, scholars of Epstein's stripe have
won the day in health care. While twenty years ago, it was com-
pletely anathema to suggest that market principles should domi-
nate health care, that is simply not the case today.'
For years, the major debate in health care policy centered on
universal access through a single-payer system. Then Professor
Joseph Newhouse at Harvard University, and the team he led at
the RAND Institute, conclusively demonstrated what economic
theorists had long predicted: universal first-dollar health insur-
ance would lead to intolerable increases in demand for health
care.' Alain Enthoven and Clark Havighurst, among others,
provided the key insights, suggesting that managed care, which
is nothing more than the application of the economic incentives of
the marketplace to the doctor-patient relationship, would be and
should be the critical basis for cost containment.3 Over the past
decade, as medical inflation has continued to increase, as regula-
tory methods have failed to decrease that inflation, and as busi-
ness has made clear that it cannot tolerate perpetual double-digit
increases in costs of health care, managed care methods have be-
come far more widespread. Today in health care policy, there is
only one subject: managed care. Almost any other health care ini-
tiative is viewed through this prism. Patients are the consumers
in a managed care relationship, and physicians, hospitals, and
other providers of health care must learn to succeed in a mar-
1 I will not provide extensive footnotes throughout this piece. A variety of summary
law review articles published in the last year have done so. By far the most comprehen-
sive and provocative of these is Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Ap-
proach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 Ind L J 1015 (1997). See also
Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 Cal L Rev 1449 (1994).
2 See Joseph P. Newhouse, Free for All? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance
Experiment (Harvard 1993).
See, for example, Alain C. Enthoven, Theory and Practice of Managed Competition
in Health Care Finance 9 (Elsevier Science 1988); Clark C. Havighurst, Deregulating the
Health Care Industry: Planning for Competition 14 (Ballinger 1982).
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ketplace. Contracts dominate provider behavior. The beleaguered
set of scholars from fifteen years ago has now triumphed.
But little of this is discussed in Mortal Peril. As a result, this
fascinating book feels as though it is missing a dimension that
could make it even more provocative. Instead, much of Epstein's
attention is focused on somewhat peripheral issues that have not
yet yielded completely to market approaches. Perhaps, however,
this is the beginning of the worst kind of book review, one which
criticizes the book for what does not appear, rather than investi-
gating what does appear. And there is much to say about what
does appear.
Mortal Peril is organized into three sections. In the first sec-
tion, the Introduction, Epstein develops his theory of the state,
profiling his libertarian political philosophy. Then, in Part One,
which really grows out of the Introduction, Epstein discusses no-
tions of access, and concludes that any form of a right to health
care is intellectually bankrupt. This is the part I find most inter-
esting, as it addresses certain critical issues in health care policy
and financing. Finally, Part Two, the second half of the book,
consists of three prolonged essays on specific subjects: the ethics
of transplantation, euthanasia, and malpractice liability.
Each of the sections of the book's main body is a testament to
Epstein's unique combination of intellectual insight and com-
mand of details. One cannot help but be astounded by Epstein's
work ethic. His descriptions of issues as diverse as the history of
Medicare, the operation of transplant waiting lists, and the use
of Acute Physiology, Age, Chronic Health Evaluation scores in in-
tensive care units are as deep and accurate as any found in the
health policy literature. He never samples the literature selec-
tively. All arguments, whether opposing or in sympathy with his
position, are carefully dissected and addressed.4
Again, there is a slight rub. While Epstein's policy discus-
sions are elegant and correct, there is some sense that he is
missing the tiny details that give many policy issues their special
urgency. Epstein appears to acknowledge as much in the con-
cluding postscript to Mortal Peril. He notes that the job of aca-
demics is "to describe and prescribe, and to show how the de-
scriptions we give support the prescriptions that we propose"
(p 419). For managers in health care on the other hand, "[t]he
constant theme is working the trade-offs that are implicit in all
Teaching a course on Health Policy and Medical Ethics this summer to physicians
training in health policy, I have concluded that Mortal Peril is the best available intro-
duction for them on health policy. I doubt Epstein intended the book for this purpose, but
his care in understanding and explicating policy issues is unrivaled.
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decisions" (p 419). It is working these trade-offs that brings some
of the issues that Epstein discusses to life, and that is apparent
in several sections of the book.
The limits of this book review format will not allow me to
review comprehensively all aspects of Moral Peril. Instead, I will
pick and choose selectively, a perhaps unfair approach, but one
that I think will best introduce Epstein's perspective. Because
Epstein approaches his subject from a highly particular-and
perhaps overly narrow-perspective, in Part I of the review, I
discuss Epstein's political philosophy. Then, in Part II, I tackle
how the application of Epstein's "negative rights" approach may
play out in the distribution of health care in the United States.
Finally, in Part III, I discuss the issue of medical malpractice,
and conclude that today's ill-functioning malpractice system
demonstrates that, in some cases, the negative rights approach
cannot be relied on to produce desired social goals.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
One cannot review the book without grappling with Ep-
stein's political philosophy. He states that it is best first to dis-
cuss rights, before turning to health care (p 5). Epstein has a
very straightforward view of the relationships between citizens.
He uses Sir Isiah Berlin's notion of positive and negative rights
to illustrate it. Negative rights, as Epstein understands (and em-
braces) them, are basically libertarian rights. One has a right to
property and a right to participate in the marketplace. Neither of
these rights can be infringed; any such infringement is immoral
and, according to Epstein, should be illegal. As he notes, "[t]he
first three rules of the system of negative rights set out what in-
dividuals can do. These rights of autonomy, property, and ex-
change have distinct correlative duties which coalesce in the
fourth rule that prohibits the use of force or deceit (as with
defamation) to interfere with the rights as stated" (pp 12-13).
The attractiveness of this philosophy is its simplicity and endur-
ance. However, Epstein's rendition differs from that provided by
other libertarians, for Epstein is opposed to any forced redistri-
bution of wealth. In a system of negative rights, one has a right
to be free from interference by others. Absent a contractual rela-
tionship, however, one has no right to support from others, in-
cluding health care support. Only a system of positive rights
gives citizens a duty to support the less fortunate. Because a
right to health care, or universal access, creates a duty to support
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others and redistributes wealth, Epstein's opposition to such a
right is simple and obdurate.'
In contrast to the latter parts of the book in which he consid-
ers many alternative viewpoints, the only opposing views Epstein
considers in his discussion of negative and positive rights come
from Judge Richard Posner and Professor Allen Buchanan. These
scholars have little in common, but they do present what Epstein
understands as the main intellectual opposition to his viewpoint.
First, Epstein is forced to struggle with Posner's proposition that
it is very difficult to make interpersonal comparisons of utility,
and that the collapse of comparisons of utility into comparisons
of wealth corrupts the libertarian position (pp 34-36). According
to this argument in favor of a right to health care, a focus on
wealth maximization alone cannot give rise to maximum social
utility because desired-and desirable, from a utility maximiza-
tion standpoint-transactions do not take place when the pro-
spective buyer lacks the necessary funds. Epstein concludes that
generally there is sufficient correspondence between wealth and
utility that such concerns can be laid aside, and where such cor-
respondence is lacking, voluntary charitable giving provides a
better means of maximizing utility than a system of forced redis-
tribution administered by the government (pp 35-37).
What is not discussed is the relationship between a utilitar-
ian political theory and a libertarian political theory. Philoso-
phers are quite able to develop hypotheticals in which utilitarian
views come into conflict with libertarian views. Certainly there
are ways to argue that a right to health care-or even of univer-
sal access to health care-would serve utilitarian ends by assur-
ing adequate health care for the entire population. Careful cost-
benefit analyses of such a large proposition are not really possi-
ble, but at least theoretically that argument can be made.
Epstein would not be in favor of the redistribution entailed by
such access to health care even if utility were maximized. There-
fore, he should be more careful when utilitarian views grow out
of his discussions of libertarianism.
Buchanan's argument that there is insufficient charity to
provide care for all, and that universal access to health care is
' Thus, Epstein would say he is out of step with the dominant regime. Yet the United
States is hardly a leader in redistribution in health care, at least as far as industrialized
countries go. In fact, we have almost no right to health care, and the patchwork of access
to health care we do provide comes from a variety of common law rules, state regulations,
and federal programs. We have inherited this patchwork because we have been unable or,
more important, unwilling, to redistribute wealth in a way that would provide a right to
health care. This makes us distinctive in the developed world. Libertarian views are more
influential than Epstein gives them credit for (or, than Epstein believes).
1998]
The University of Chicago Law Review
simply an extension of charity, is more readily forced aside
(pp 37-39). Epstein's libertarianism, faithful to the tradition, val-
ues free giving (charity) as an important part of a successful po-
litical structure. However, no one should be required to give: not
only does forced redistribution violate the sanctity of the right to
property, but such redistribution is not necessary to ensure the
transfer of wealth from the monied members of society to those
less well-off.
Epstein appears to have little interest, at least in this book,
in taking on other twentieth century political philosophies. Many
of these are just as philosophically elegant as the libertarian
view. For example, Sandel's foundation of a communitarian po-
litical philosophy in Kantian epistemology6 is every bit as inter-
esting to those of us who do not bring strong political views to the
dance.7 In any case, Mortal Peril does not defend the libertarian
view against opposing philosophies, but rather uses it to analyze
health care issues. Therefore, we should understand that it offers
a specific perspective.
Because many of us do not follow the libertarian philoso-
phies, some readers might conclude that this is an appropriate
time to put aside Mortal Peril for other reading. That would be a
mistake. As Epstein argues, the libertarian is better acquainted
with certain aspects of reality that are often overlooked by more
classical liberals and especially social liberals. These are, as
characterized by Epstein, the problems of scarcity, self-interest,
and enforceability (pp 44-48). It is true that much of social liber-
alism overlooks issues of scarcity, and those issues are salient in
health care. As the costs of health care continue to increase,
pushed by new technology and demographic pressures, we will
not be able to provide all that we have the capacity to provide.
Indeed, it is cost constraints, not access or quality (the other
major axes that are ground in discussions of health care policy),
that have dominated and will continue to dominate policy discus-
sion.
A corollary of scarcity is that all players in health care will
continue to act according to their own self-interest. Like it or not,
we are in a market-dominated liberal structure in which enlight-
ened individuals maximize their own advantages. Thus, a system
Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge 1982).
Sandel, as I have noted, objects to the foundational role classical liberalism gives to
rights and justice as the primary means of organizing social relations. Instead, Sandel fa-
vors ordering relations between citizens according to individual virtues and group soli-
darity, with notions ofjustice playing a secondary role. See Troyen A. Brennan, Just Doc-
toring: Medical Ethics in the Liberal State 84-85 (California 1991).
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of universal access is plagued by difficulties not present in a
negative rights system, such as extracting the wealth necessary
to finance the health care system (pp 44-45). As Epstein notes,
the social engineers behind the Clinton health plan tended to
overlook issues of both scarcity and self-interest. They never re-
alized and never addressed the fact that there was insufficient
momentum to develop the kind of broad-based taxes necessary to
fund a system of universal access. Their hubris in this regard is
one of Epstein's major targets, but perhaps too easy of one.
Epstein's third problem, that of enforceability, is a much
more debatable concept. A great student of the common law, Ep-
stein has previously noted a host of problems that comes with
turning moral principles into legal rights. He has insightfully ar-
gued that certain kinds of principles cannot be adhered to simply
because they do not fit into our common law structure. For Ep-
stein, a most significant problem is the "constant pounding" a
system of universal access will take in a real world setting from
the difficulties of government administration (p 46).
Unfortunately, Mortal Peril takes this argument too far. It
appears at times that Epstein is positing that no system other
than one based on negative rights can work because of the im-
possibility of translating positive rights into legal rules. Yet once
he moves to the empirical analysis, he provides only anecdotes;
he seems to overlook the need to go beyond the theoretical and
into the assessment of evidence. It is certainly true that political
corruption and incomplete knowledge will corrupt many pro-
grams intended to enforce positive rights. On the other hand,
some redistribution systems do work, and do enhance utility,
even if I doubt Epstein would be compelled to forsake libertari-
anism. Conversely, one need not embrace libertarianism simply
because some or even many redistribution systems do not work,
and fail to produce net utility.
We do have a certain amount of redistribution even in our
relatively libertarian society, and this redistribution does "work"
in certain aspects. If he were to travel from Hyde Park into
neighborhoods in South Chicago, Epstein would find ample evi-
dence that aspects of the welfare state are not producing their in-
tended goals. On the other hand, he would find some that are op-
erating appropriately, and producing outcomes that are com-
pletely in touch with the vision of those positive right advocates
who created the original legislation.8 Since there is such empiri-
' The best example remains the expansion of Medicaid health care for pregnant
women. See, for example, Paul A. Buescher, et al, An Evaluation of the Impact of Mater-
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cal evidence, does this mean that the libertarian approach is fa-
tally flawed? Definitely not. But it does mean that it should be
seen simply as one perspective, not as the only approach possible
to a successful political system. That Canada has a successfully
functioning system of universal access, albeit with many warts,
does not mean that we can dismiss Epstein. It does mean that
Epstein's more absolutist libertarian tenets must be put aside.
Epstein himself seems to recognize this. For instance, in his
discussion of euthanasia, he goes into great detail about the
regulatory features of the Dutch euthanasia laws, and the efforts
to emulate those in the Oregon propositions supporting euthana-
sia (pp 317-28). As a libertarian, he believes that individuals
should have a right to euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.
Yet he appears to be willing to sanction some state oversight of
this right in order to avoid potential abuses (pp 315-16). While
later he states the right in more absolutist terms, one that is un-
fettered by state regulation, the reader nonetheless has the sense
that there is a willingness to compromise.
II. ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
Fresh from this philosophical background, Epstein launches
into an analysis of universal access. He does not follow the usual
path'of discussing broad taxation and insurance-based access.
Instead, he opts for analysis of the common law right to emer-
gency medical care. This is an inspired move. Epstein recognizes
that the right to health care in this country is nothing more than
a common law right to emergency medical treatment. From an
empirical point of view, there is no other right to health care, and
this particular right is a very thin one. Epstein details the dispa-
rate set of cases that create a right to emergency room care and
then focuses on the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act of 1986 ("EMTALA:) (p 91). He realizes that if
he can provide the intellectual basis for rolling back EMTALA, it
will go a long way toward stunting the already very scanty redis-
tributional impulse in American health policy.
The structure of this argument is clever. Epstein knows that
the relationship between doctors and patients has always been
nity Care Coordination on Medicaid Birth Outcomes in North Carolina, 81 Am J Public
Health 1625 (1991); Joyce M. Piper, Edward F. Mitchel, Jr., and Wayne A. Ray, Presump-
tive Eligibility for Pregnant Medicaid Enrollees: Its Effects on? Prenatal Care and Perina-
tal Outcome, 84 Am J Public Health 1626 (1994); Denise M. Oliansky, Susan Schooley,
and Tommye Arnold, Perinatal Outcomes and Patient Satisfaction in the Evaluation of
Two Medicaid Demonstration Projects, 13 AHSR and FHSR Annual Meeting Abstract
Book 174 (1996).
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one of free contract; doctors are able to decide whom to treat and
when to treat them-within the constraints of the arcane restric-
tions of abandonment law.' Common law courts, on the other
hand, have treated hospitals, in particular their emergency de-
partments, as creating situations in which individuals come to
rely on gratuitous undertaking. While Epstein may argue that
this is somewhere the common law should never have gone, it is
nonetheless a reality. The set of emergency care rights has since
been fortified by courts that have woven in state regulations, ac-
creditation issues, and antidiscrimination law to find a relatively
vigorous right to emergency medical care. Once the doors of the
emergency department are open to patients, then the usual pa-
rameters of tort law apply, and patients cannot be cared for ex-
cept according to the standard expected of the reasonable medi-
cal practitioner.
To avoid being forced into providing emergency room treat-
ment and to maintain their right to contract freely-as well as to
avoid caring for impoverished patients with little or no chance of
reimbursement-private hospitals in the 1970s and 1980s
learned to transfer unwanted patients to public hospitals. Ep-
stein notes that in Chicago, at Cook County Hospital, Dr. Gordon
Robert L. Schiff and his colleagues documented an extraordinary
growth in transfers of impoverished patients, including many
transfers that endangered patient well-being (p 93). While
Americans lack the political will to provide universal access for
these patients, the abuses of so-called "dumping" spurred Con-
gress into action, resulting in the EMTALA.
Prior to sending an unwanted patient to another medical fa-
cility, EMTALA requires hospitals to document that another
hospital has accepted the patient, and that the patient is well
enough to be transferred. Litigation around EMTALA, and a
linkage of EMTALA claims to other forms of malpractice claims,
has changed significantly the behavior of physicians working in
emergency departments. In my opinion, the American College of
Emergency Medicine has integrated fully the prohibitions
against transfer from one emergency department to another into
Abandonment law has traditionally held that a medical provider may not withdraw
his services from a patient who needs further medical attention without giving the pa-
tient sufficient notice to find another provider. Epstein does not discuss the more modern
notions of abandonment that are developing in cases brought by HIV-infected individuals
who are refused treatment. See Scott Burris, Dental Discrimination Against the HIV-
Infected: Empirical Data, Law and Public Policy, 13 Yale J Reg 1 (1996). It would be very
interesting to see Epstein's perspective on these cases.
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its training of residents and attending physicians. EMTALA rea-
sonably has solved a problem that was significant and severe.
Epstein understands what an affront EMTALA is to freedom
of contract for hospitals. As a result, he would like to character-
ize it as a rupture with common law. I think it is much more ap-
propriate to see it as an evolution of the common law. Americans
are not committed to a universal right to health care. But we do
think that individuals who need care should be able to go to
emergency departments, and if necessary be hospitalized. This is
the extent of redistribution that we expect, and it would perhaps
be better to view EMTALA as a reasonable compromise in a soci-
ety that generally foregoes redistribution.
Moving from the theoretical to the factual, Epstein argues
that EMTALA has hurt medical care by endangering emergency
medical treatment. He argues that many emergency departments
are closing because they do not wish to care for the patients who
would now be admitted. Citing problems with certain urban
emergency medical technician ("EMT") triage systems that have
developed as a result of closure of emergency departments, Ep-
stein points specifically to the experience of the University of
Chicago hospitals (pp 95-99). As Epstein explains, the University
hospital system at one time participated, along with other Chi-
cago hospitals, in an ambulance network that carried patients to
the participating hospital with the greatest number of beds
available in its emergency room, regardless of whether the cho-
sen hospital was closest to the point of pickup. The University
hospitals withdrew from this network, however, after the city
government rejected the diversion system in favor of a require-
ment that all patients go to the nearest hospital in the network-
a requirement that, because of its location on the South Side of
Chicago, proved especially burdensome to the University system.
I think that Epstein is somewhat off the mark in linking
EMTALA with decreases in the availability and quality of emer-
gency room treatment. The problem with EMT systems in certain
cities, especially Los Angeles but to some extent in Chicago, is
that they have been overwhelmed by the amount of trauma that
results from urban violence. This has not been the case in most
other large cities."0 Moreover, for most urban hospitals, it does
" Epstein's hypothesis that EMTALA is inducing hospitals to close emergency de-
partments may not hold up under empirical scrutiny. I contacted the American Hospital
Association and American College of Emergency Physicians to compile the following ta-
ble. The table indicates that the hospitals that are closing are those that do not have
emergency departments, just the opposite of what Epstein would predict.
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not make any economic sense to close the emergency department.
First, in operating a reasonable health care system, you must be
able to provide emergency treatment for the patients of the pri-
mary care doctors on your staff. Second, in most cities, under
most insurance plans, trauma patients are well-insured, espe-
cially for the hospital willing to undertake reasonable coordina-
tion of benefits. Third, the University of Chicago experience is
inapposite. While the University of Chicago did drop out of the
triage system for EMTs in Chicago, it did not close its emergency
department. Anyone who walks into the University of Chicago
emergency department is subject to EMTALA. They cannot be
"dumped" to Cook County or any other hospital. I believe, moreo-
ver, that a prohibition on dumping is clearly aligned with the
moral and political sensibilities of most Americans, and would be
considered rational in any rendition of liberalism. In both con-
texts, the inefficiencies associated with a ban on dumping would
be tolerated, as would the infringement on negative rights. That
Epstein finds this a critical issue in health care is indicative of
the rather radical position he advocates.
Emergency Departments and Hospitals (1981-94)*
Year Number of Number of Number of Percentage of
Emergency Emergency Hospitals/ Hospitals with
Department Departments/ Percentage Emergency
Visits Percentage Change Since Departments
Change Since 1991
1991
1981 83,024,984 5,340 6,276 85.1
1982 81,147,512 5,318 (-0.4) 6,277(0.0) 84.7
1983 77,522,254 5,406(1.2) 6,353 (1.2) 85.1
1984 78,492,455 5,397(1.1) 6,302(0.4) 85.6
1985 80,079,345 5,382(0.8) 6,304(0.4) 85.3
1986 82,177,221 5,340(0.0) 6,290(0.2) 84.9
1987 83,478,208 5,272 (-1.3) 6,281 (0.0) 83.9
1988 86,641,305 5,197 (-2.7) 6,291 (0.2) 82.6
1989 89,730,589 5,133 (-3.9) 6,174 (-1.6) 83.1
1990 92,080,647 5,070 (-5.1) 6,105 (-2.7) 83.0
1991 93,469,930 4,973 (-6.9) 6,044 (-3.7) 82.3
1992 95,817,758 4,881 (-8.6) 5,916 (-5.7) 82.5
1993 97,379,119 4,988 (-6.6) 5,789 (-7.8) 86.2
1994 96,014,347 4,856 (-9.1) 5,387 (-14.2) 90.1
*Source: American Hospital Association, American College of Emergency Medicine.
The above data could be analyzed and perhaps some support for Epstein's theory
would emerge, but the raw data suggest that as the climate grows more competitive, hos-
pitals with emergency departments are more financially viable, and thus a higher propor-
tion of hospitals have emergency departments. It is not clear why Epstein would not take
a few hours to check the empirical evidence available on this critical point.
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It is here, and only in this part of the book, where one gets
the impression of mean spiritedness that makes Epstein's posi-
tion a somewhat unattractive political philosophy. Epstein won-
ders why hospitals like the University of Chicago should be made
to care for individuals who through their own responsibility have
brought ill health upon themselves. He notes that:
Unfortunately the current law makes it impossible for a
hospital to treat drug addicts or alcoholics just once, or even
twice, with this stern warning: there is no treatment next
time, period-no matter what their personal consequences,
including death. To the question, "you cannot let them die,
can you?" we have to avoid the reflective answer, no. To re-
store long-term stability to the system of emergency care,
the answer has to be "yes, we can sometimes." That threat
becomes credible only if it is acted on at least once (p 103).
In support, Epstein notes a Wall Street Journal article in which a
patient was noted to have infected her heart valve through use of
heroin, received a new heart valve, and then reinfected the artifi-
cial valve, again using heroin (p 102).11 Epstein would not treat
this patient again.
Epstein's example comes from the real world and presents a
dilemma faced by many physicians. Indeed, I have several pa-
tients, among a patient panel that includes numerous intrave-
nous drug abusers and individuals infected with HIV through
use of dirty needles, who have required valve replacement as a
result of endocarditis from injecting. Should any of them reinfect
an artificial valve, I will advocate (I suspect successfully) that the
artificial valve be replaced. Hospitalization and professional costs
for this episode will likely run over $75,000. Very little of this
will be reimbursed by welfare programs, especially if the patient
is a nondisabled male who does not qualify for Medicaid.
The overall majority of physicians would do exactly the same
thing. They would do so because they are committed to the indi-
vidual patient, and respect the principles of compassion that are
central to medical ethics. Perhaps more importantly, I know each
of these intravenous drug users as individual human beings.
Most are clean for long periods of time, many slip back into epi-
sodes of a couple of weeks of drug abuse, and a reinfection could
be seen as just a matter of poor luck. Almost none fit the meta-
phor of ghoulish irresponsibility that Epstein rails against.
" Sally L. Satel, Examining Entitlements for the Mentally ill, Wall Street J A14 (Jan
28, 1993).
[65:345
Health Care
I do not cite these differences for moralistic or bombastic
purposes. Rather, the differences show the conflict between Ep-
stein's analytical approach and more traditional views. The rela-
tionship of trust, the altruistic commitment to the patient, and
the role of compassion in dealing with sick individuals only tan-
gentially make the scene. Mortal Peril is a book about moral and
political issues in medical care, but it is not a book about medical
ethics. Epstein devotes no space to the discussion or analysis of
ethical propositions in medical care, for, in Epstein's view, ethical
considerations are trumped by the individual's right to be free
from interference.
For example, in his discussion of euthanasia, Epstein takes
issue with Dr. Leon Kass's assertion that the deep trust that
characterizes the doctor-patient relationship and the medical
ethics structure that grows out of it should prohibit any turn to-
ward legalizing euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide (pp 306-
08). In Kass's view, no doctor-even one who favors physician-
assisted suicide-should be allowed to practice euthanasia, be-
cause doctors are bound to ethical standards that call for them to
preserve life and prohibit them from killing patients, ever
(p 306). Epstein quickly lays Kass's proposition aside as periph-
eral to the problem. While Epstein acknowledges the importance
of trust between doctor and patient, he argues that a self-
assumed ethical code should not interfere with the individual pa-
tient's rights. As Epstein notes, his goal is to make medical care
into a competitive industry: "As with all competitive industries,
market pressures bleed out cross-subsidies between customers."
(p 122). Epstein's approach tends, perhaps overly, to bleed out
notions of compassion that are critical to understanding medical
care.
I do not wish to carry this point too far. In his discussion of
the negative rights framework, Epstein emphasizes the impor-
tance of charity in any political state. Many libertarians have a
charitable impulse that is much stronger than that of some liber-
als who would prefer to have the state undertake redistribution.
The mean spiritedness is not that of libertarians, but of elements
of libertarian philosophy.
The next target for Epstein, in his effort to restrict the redis-
tribution that is central to universal access to health care, is
community rating. Designed to increase the availability of insur-
ance to high-risk persons, a community rating system forbids in-
surers from considering certain factors-such as age, sex, or
prior medical history-when determining the insured's premium,
notwithstanding their predictive value. Building on the distinc-
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tion between casualty and social insurance, Epstein demon-
strates that regulating health insurance by requiring insurers to
"community rate" essentially eliminates the efficiency of any in-
surance market. Casualty insurance is a system of discrimina-
tion. If insurers are not allowed to discriminate, powerful eco-
nomic incentives suggest that "good risks" will drop out of the
market or engage in riskier activities, increasing the overall cost
of insurance and frustrating the access intentions of the propo-
nents of community rating. Epstein focuses on real world exam-
ples of community rating, including the New York state system.
He allows that a series of qualifications on the New York law re-
duces the effect of community rating, qualifications that are
based on the same economic insights that Epstein provides (pp
123-27). However, again the empirical story is not quite what one
would predict theoretically. 2
Epstein's economic analysis is even more compelling for the
problems raised by genetic discrimination in insurance (pp 133-
36). Genetic analysis of risk changes the whole framework for
casualty insurance in health care. Epstein provides a very apt
analysis, comparing health care to the shipping industry (p 129).
In the shipping industry, there is a predictable yet random rate
of breakage. Casualty insurance works very well in this regard,
as the shipper can purchase relatively cheap insurance that
closely approximates the risk of breakage multiplied by the value
of the product. Once we begin to uncover significant information
about the risk of the disease by analyzing the genetic structure of
individuals, however, we lose the homogenous and random risk
factor that makes casualty insurance attractive. Some individu-
als become simply uninsurable. At the point at which casualty
insurance breaks down all together, what would Epstein do? If,
for example, only 30 percent of the population have any interest
in casualty health insurance-35 percent being too genetically
burdened to purchase, 35 percent being genetically gifted enough
to do without-then would it not be more attractive to move to
systematic social insurance? This is an issue that deserves
greater reflection than Epstein offers.
Epstein's discussion of Medicare raises similar concerns
about the effect of redistribution on the social good. He provides
an insightful exposition of the way Medicare works, with regards
to paying both hospitals and doctors. He argues that Medicare
2 The story is indeed very complicated, with a large number of unanticipated effects
when insurance regulations change. See Katherine Swartz and Deborah Garnick, Regu-
lating Individual Health Insurance Markets: Be Wary of Unintended Consequences, Draft
Report, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (Oct 7, 1997).
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currently operates as a "defined benefit" system, in that "the gov-
ernment first sets out entitlements and then scrambles to fund
them" (p 176). The better economic approach, Epstein maintains,
is a "defined contribution" system akin to a voucher system, un-
der which "the government assumes a fixed financial obligation
to Medicare recipients ... that allows each recipient to purchase
the Medicare set of benefits" that he or she so chooses from the
available pool of private providers (p 176). He argues that if indi-
viduals are provided vouchers, they can make market decisions
about how to spend them, fostering competition and enhancing
efficiency among the providers.
As might be expected, Epstein is much more honest about
the difficulties of a voucher system than are other economists on
the right. Epstein explains that "a nominal defined contribution
plan is really an estimated prepayment of anticipated expenses
for future years" (p 179). Such a plan raises significant obstacles:
under a voucher system, the government will be required to cal-
culate each individual participant's future health care needs and
provide vouchers in an appropriate amount to cover those needs.
Otherwise, some voucher recipients will be able to obtain first-
class insurance, while others-those more elderly or in frail
health-will be out of pocket (pp 178-81). As Epstein points out,
"it is not likely that any government agency can make these cal-
culations for each person on a yearly basis without overwhelming
the system." (p 179). Furthermore, Epstein allows, in a way that
most voucher advocates will not, that:
The only way to obviate this impasse is to set premiums that
refuse to individuate to this degree and that force some indi-
viduals to bear privately the losses that were covered under
the old, defined benefit program. . . Only if the govern-
ment-meaning public opinion-is prepared to "just say no"
to persons with heavy disabilities and little means to cope
with them, can this problem be attacked (p 181).
I agree with Epstein that the forms of Medicare that use vouch-
ers to emulate the market will work only if Americans are pre-
pared to have a market without redistribution. If the redistribu-
tive ethic remains, then vouchers are not a long-term solution to
financing health care for the elderly. I might suggest that public
opinion and political will are opposed to letting elderly people die
because they do not have means to pay for medical care. How-
ever, a decade ago, I could not see that Havighurst- and Entho-
ven-style positions would come to dominate medical care as they
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have. Perhaps Epstein is just slightly ahead of his time in these
views.
I believe, however, we are headed in a different direction.
Rather than explicitly rationing medical care under a libertarian
market theory, or providing the broad revenues from taxes that
would be necessary to undertake redistribution, I hypothesize
that we will instead rely on physicians to undertake implicit ra-
tioning to constrain health care costs. I find some support for this
even in Mortal Peril. In his discussion of the extent to which
medical technology should be used to prolong life in terminal
cases, Epstein overviews the Acute Physiology, Age, Chronic
Health Evaluation ("APACHE") system for rating the likelihood
of survival for patients admitted to intensive care units ("ICUs").
He suggests that APACHE scores could be used to ration ICU
services (pp 72-76). However, he later relents and suggests that
perhaps it would be better to give physicians global budgets and
leave it to them to ration care appropriately (pp 77-79).
This is not what I expected from Epstein. As he acknowl-
edges, leaving the rationing of ICU care to physicians is a rejec-
tion of "individual choice in favor of systematic coercion" (p 77),
and thus an affront to the negative rights framework. As noted
earlier, Epstein does not believe medical ethics should in any
way trump patient liberties. Therefore, it is perhaps anti-
libertarian to put physicians in control of doling out ICU re-
sources.
Yet it is exactly this impulse that I argue is growing in
health care. Managed care, as I noted at the outset, is nothing
more than bringing economic incentives to the doctor-patient re-
lationship. More importantly, true managed care, in which the
physician receives prepayments for health care on a per capita
basis, forces the doctor to decide how to spend resources on be-
half of patients. In a hidden, implicit way, physicians then ration
health care. As the per capita payment rates decrease, physicians
increasingly face trade-offs between individual patients and
make decisions on their behalf. This is not a libertarian ap-
proach. Nor is it necessarily a liberal approach. But it does lead
to reductions in costs of health care, as it creates a trade-off be-
tween physician income and use of resources on behalf of pa-
tients-a blunt economic incentive.
Managed care, then, is a matter of market incentives. But it
does not increase individual patient choice. In fact, as Enthoven
has repeatedly noted, the main customer in health care is the
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benefits manager at the place of employment.13 Managed care
eliminates the moral hazard faced by the physician in the in-
demnity insurance world, where physicians are encouraged to
provide unnecessary services for patients so as to increase their
income. However, managed care replaces this temptation with a
situation in which it is in the physician's economic interest to re-
duce patient choice.
The market has produced managed care. But managed care
is criticized for lack of patient choice. Epstein proposes libertari-
anism and the market as the basis for thinking through medical
care. However, in this situation, the market and patient choice,
and indeed individual patient liberties, are in conflict with one
another. Perhaps this is why some of the thorny problems associ-
ated with managed care are avoided in Mortal Peril.
III. MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
Just as Epstein's approach to the thorny questions sur-
rounding access to health care eschews traditional approaches in
favor of a refreshing new perspective, so, too, does his approach
to medical malpractice liability. Epstein invokes the common law
of charitable immunity to argue in favor of contractual rather
than tort solutions to medical injuries. He reviews the concept of
charitable immunity, which historically held that charitable or-
ganizations, including hospitals, were immune from suit, and
notes that hospitals would in certain cases waive their immunity
in order to retain some residual protection in other cases. He ap-
propriately sees any waiver of charitable immunity as akin to
contracting and makes an almost communitarian appeal for con-
tract:
The alternative approach, therefore, rejects the view that
medical malpractice is an extension of negligence law and
stranger cases. Instead it places assumption of risk and
freedom of contract at the fore in shaping legal rules. No
longer is the primary job of the law to keep people apart. It
seeks to develop optimal rules for risk-sharing between par-
ties to a joint venture (p 366, footnote omitted).
Epstein then reviews the difficulties with the present system of
medical malpractice. These arguments are perhaps less creative
than those found elsewhere in Mortal Peril, but Epstein reaches
the same point as do other commentators. 4 Tort law, at least in
"See, for example, Enthoven, Theory and Practice at 82 (cited in note 3).
"See, for example, Paul C. Weiler, et al, A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury,
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the area of medical malpractice, is ineffective at providing its in-
tended social goals of injury prevention and compensation of in-
jured plaintiffs. Epstein argues that the major alternatives to
medical malpractice, tort reform, regulatory reform, and a no-
fault system, are ineluctably weak. 5 The conclusion is that the
present system does not "work," and a contract regime is the best
alternative.
However, any reform is unlikely in medical malpractice,
largely because the system does work for the key players. The
market in medical malpractice benefits plaintiffs' attorneys, as
well as malpractice underwriters and their defense attorneys,
even if it is inefficient at reaching the social goals of deterrence
and compensation. In this regard, Epstein's version of the history
of medical malpractice misses some key points. Changes in the
underpinnings of tort law from the 1930s through the 1950s re-
duced barriers to suits for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' attorneys did not
harvest these reductions until the 1960s and, especially, the
1970s, ensuring correlative increases in malpractice litigation.
The tort crisis in the mid-1970s, which was especially severe for
medical malpractice, forced many insurers out of the market and
led to the creation of so-called "bed-pan" mutuals. These bed-pan
mutuals took advantage of the relatively small amounts of tort
reform and enjoyed slightly decreased rates of claims in the late
1970s. However, these amateur insurers settled small claims all
too quickly, leading to an increase in the interest of plaintiffs' at-
torneys in medical malpractice claims.
The plaintiffs' attorneys rushed to file claims, creating the
maelstrom of the mid-1980s and a tremendous increase in
claims. This "second crisis" led to unprecedented tort reform in
nearly every state, stabilizing the medical malpractice market.
Since that time, claim rates have only very slowly increased, al-
beit while average settlements have increased at rates that are
slightly greater than the rate of medical inflation. Today, the
medical malpractice system is very stable, with relatively expert
insurers and their defense firms lined up against a relatively
small group of expert plaintiffs in most metropolitan areas. Thus,
although it fails to accomplish its intended goals, medical mal-
practice is a stable market and, as such, its key players-the
small cadre of successful plaintiffs' attorneys plus the medical
malpractice underwriters and their defense attorneys-are unin-
Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation 76 (Harvard 1993).
"5 On these small points as well as many others, I would take exception with Epstein's
conclusions. As usual, however, he does identify the most significant weaknesses of any
opposing position.
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terested in reform. They will exert their power in the legislature
to maintain the status quo. It is likely that they will succeed in
this endeavor.
The stable malpractice market scenario raises one more
question for Epstein. Medical malpractice is not a heavily regu-
lated market. There are a variety of common law rules and some
statutory provisions that create the architecture for litigation,
but the malpractice system is not, in traditional terms, "regu-
lated." It is a market into which new providers of medical mal-
practice insurance, new providers of plaintiffs' attorneys' exper-
tise, and new providers of defense expertise are able to move,
once they overcome the usual barriers of self-education and capi-
talization. These are the characteristics of a relatively well-
functioning market.
Yet the malpractice system does not accomplish the goals we
expect. Many markets will not. That is why we have regulation.
Of course, I would not expect Epstein to endorse this, but, as a
society, we should recognize that some social goals require social
engineering. Stable markets that create large profits for well-
placed interests do not necessarily, through the invisible hand of
the market, give rise to desired social goals.
CONCLUSION
Mortal Peril is both a fascinating and provocative book.
From a perspective that is steadfastly libertarian and market-
oriented, Richard Epstein offers a variety of valuable insights
into our health care system. This reviewer's only complaint is
that there is not more. While one might expect fairly patent lib-
ertarian answers to questions about euthanasia (strongly suppor-
tive of an individual's rights regarding euthanasia) and organ
transplantation (open to a full market in organs, including living
donor sale of kidneys), many other issues are less straightfor-
ward. Epstein's view on health care financing is brutally honest,
especially insofar as it traces the ultimate outcome of any full-
blooded voucher system. His view of malpractice litigation-that
it should give way to contractual relationships-is intellectually
vibrant.
Given this sample of Epstein's views, I would encourage him
to address the most challenging issue rising in health care today,
namely, managed care. It is here that notions of consumer choice
in the market have come furthest in medical care. However, it is
not clear that individual patients, as consumers, retain the liber-
tarian negative rights that Epstein might expect. Managed care
is a hard case for both the left and the right. Perhaps in the fu-
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ture, Epstein will bring his unshakable libertarian beliefs and
keen intellectual skills to the questions of our evolving organiza-
tion of medical care.
